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COUNTRY	Bolivia		REPORT NO.		
SUBJECT .	Reaction of Mining : Barrientos Revolution		DATE DISTR.	4 Dec 64	
	Investment Atmospher Private US Business	re/Resistance of	NO. PAGES	2 .	
•	Activities of Comibo		REFERENCES		
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1.	that a relatively on	timistic atmosphere p	revalls conce	it is noted	
	of the Barrientos Re	volution. The feeling able and patriotic men	g is that the	new military	
	contact with US auth	orities either in Bol: ement is General Rene	ivia, Panama d	or the US. The	
2,	The political tradit	ion of the "Ins and O	its" continue	s since many	
	exiled politicians have now returned to Bolivia. These individuals form cliques and are very power hungry. They are for the most part anti-communistic and would like to cooperate with the US, probably with the hope of receiving US AID. Juan <u>Icchin</u> Oquendo's group, PRIN, is still intact although the arry controlled their activities effectively during the days preceding the "revolution of restoration", as the Barrientos maneuver is popularly known.				
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	It is hoped that US recognition will not be withheld too long since the AID program has been suspended as well, pending political clarification.				
	Recognition of the Junta will remove the opinion held by most Bolivians that the dictatorial In Faz government deserved US AID even though using				
	totalitarian methods, while the Junta which presently has substantial popular support does not qualify. Most of the political groups are				
	without financial funds and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) is badly split into factions. Under these conditions a small amount of				
	communist influence and financing could do a great deal towards controlling any post-Junta government.				
4.		e improved slightly an			
	speaking, labor condi	, workable arrangement Itions on the Northern	Altiplano (L	a Paz to the border)	
		ruro (except near Cata the areas east of the			
5.		in Bolivia is believed			
	unions run or control	e population has had a lled by the Communists ere is no reason for p	. While the	political future	
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Approved for Release Date

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considering the increase of exploration money and prospecting is recommending is entertaining a multi-million dollar investment in a placer tin operation in the Altiplano south of Oruro. The present high antimony price has resulted in a flurry of prospecting, and mineral rights in antimony properties have been run out of sight. In this field through its subsidiary M&T Chemicals. Placer tin possibilities across the Bolivian-Brazilian border near Rondonia, Brazil, are very good.

Working for Comibol, in working in the area as of November 1964.

6. No US consultants have entered the picture since the Barrientos revolution to operate Comibol mines. Its latest costs for fine tin were US\$1.91/lb. Prospection Ltd does long range prospecting for Comibol under contract. Its working group contains many competent geologists. US investors and geologists working for private companies frown on the use of the US taxpayers' money to develop new mines for Comibol and it is the general feeling that this support money could be spent more effectively through private corporations who are involved in Bolivin.

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